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A. INTRODUCTION 
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators are derived from their 
essential obligation towards the arbitrating parties, which is the 
adjudication of the dispute submitted to their jurisdiction in the 
arbitration agreement. This obligation is an accepted principle of 
arbitration laws in Europe.1 The relationships between the parties to 
the arbitration and the arbitrators themselves are in the nature of a 
contract, as can be deduced from the bilateral source of an 
arbitrator’s appointment, even when nomination is made at the 
initiative of one party, such as the nomination of a co-arbitrator. 
Thus, the choice of an arbitrator by one party is part of a contractual 
scheme between the parties and the arbitrator.2  
The United Kingdom Supreme Court highlighted in Jivraj v. 
Hashwani3 that, “[i]t is common ground, at any rate in this class of 
case, that there is a contract between the parties and the arbitrator or 
 
 *  Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals in France and adjunct professor of 
law at University Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
 1. See, e.g., L’impartialité du juge et de l’arbitre, Etude de droit comparé, J. 
van Compernolle, dir. Bruylant, 2006. 
 2. THOMAS CLAY, L’ARBITRE [THE ARBITRATOR] 482 (2001). 
 3. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [23] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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arbitrators appointed under a contract and that his or their services 
are rendered pursuant to that contract.” As explained by the Cour de 
cassation in a judgment delivered in 1972 in the Consorts Ury case in 
France, “[t]he appointment of each arbitrator is not a unilateral act, 
even when initiated by one party alone. [It] results from the common 
intention of the parties, who take into account the qualities of the 
person whom they call upon to judge their dispute.”4 Similarly, in 
Raffineries de Homs, the Paris First Instance Court decided that “[a]n 
arbitrator – who is a judge, not a representative of the party that 
appointed him – must derive his judicial powers from a single, 
common manifestation of the intentions of the parties to the 
arbitration proceedings, even though his appointment may have been 
initiated by one party alone.”5 
This view is also propounded by Phillipe Fouchard in his Report 
to the ICC on the status of arbitrators in 1995:  
[t]he settlement of a dispute is not an ‘undertaking’ or a ‘work’ as such. 
Admittedly, the arbitrator is bound to comply with [the] arbitration 
agreement and rules that the parties have adopted, but the parties are not 
allowed to go so far as to give him instructions on the manner in which he 
is to conduct the proceedings, less still in relation to the direction or 
content of his decision.6  
The judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court clarifies in 
Jivraj7 that an arbitrator is not a person employed under a contract to 
do work within the meaning of the Regulations 2003 on Employment 
Equality. The Court states,  
[t]he arbitrator is in critical respects independent of the parties. His 
functions and duties require him to rise above the partisan interests of the 
parties and not to act in, or so as to further, the particular interests of 
 
 4. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 575 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (quoting Cour 
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Apr. 13, 1972, 
JCP 1972, II, 17189 (Fr.)). 
 5. Id. (quoting Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, Mar. 28, 1984, 1985 REV. ARB. 141 (Fr.)). 
 6. Phillipe Fouchard, Les Rapports entre L’arbitre et les Parties et 
L’institution Arbitrale [Relationships Between the Arbitrator and the Parties and 
the Arbitral Institution], in BULLETIN DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE D’ARBITRAGE 
DE LA CCI, LE STATUT DE L’ARBITRE: SUPPLEMENT SPECIAL 12, 16 (1995). 
 7. Jivraj, [2011] UKSC, [41]. 
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either party. As the International Chamber of Commerce (“the ICC”) puts 
it, he must determine how to resolve their competing interests. He is in no 
sense in a position of subordination to the parties.8  
The Fouchard Report further stresses that, “[s]uch a classification 
[as an agency contract] is arguable, since the very purpose of an 
agency is to grant the agent a power of representation. Yet, the 
arbitrator does not represent the parties, less still the party that 
appointed him; the power he is granted is inherently judicial.”9 The 
Court of Appeal of Paris also held that far from being an agent of the 
parties, an arbitrator is an adjudicator.10 Fouchard suggests that the 
contract between the parties to the arbitration and the arbitrators has 
a sui generis form: “[I]ndeed the contractual relationship formed 
between the arbitrator and the parties cannot be categorized as a 
known type of civil contract. This contract contains the mixed 
characteristics of arbitration – contractual in source, judicial in 
object.”11 His views on the nature of the contract have been endorsed 
in national case law. Characterization of the contract as a sui generis 
form of agreement has been adopted by the Court of Appeal of 
Paris12 and in the concurring opinion of Lord Mance in Jivraj v. 
Hashwani.13  
Arbitrators serve an adjudicatory role and, as a result, must be 
independent of the parties and impartial.14 According to a recent 
holding of the UK Supreme Court in the case of Jivraj v. Hashwani,  
[t]he dominant purpose of appointing an arbitrator is the impartial 
resolution of dispute between the parties in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement and, although the contract between the parties and the 
arbitrators would be a contract for the provision of personal services, they 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Fouchard, supra note 6, at 15. 
 10. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 22, 1991, 1e ch., 
1996 REV. ARB. 476 (Fr.). 
 11. Fouchard, supra note 6, at 16. 
 12. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 1e civ., Paris, Dec. 13, 2001, 
2003 REV. ARB. 1312 (Fr.). 
 13. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [77] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 14. See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, Oct. 28, 1988, 1990 REV. ARB. 497 (Fr.) (recognizing that 
arbitrators, in executing their judicial function, must be independent and impartial 
to assure equitable treatment and process). 
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were not personal services under the direction of the parties.15  
Similarly, in the Consorts Ury judgment of 1972,16 the Cour de 
cassation underlined that “[a]n independent mind is indispensable in 
the exercise of judicial power, whatever the source of that power 
may be, [and it is] one of the essential qualities of an arbitrator.”17 
Admittedly, an independent arbitrator is typically impartial. An 
arbitrator may, however, be independent and yet, lack impartiality, or 
vice versa. Impartiality, as is well accepted, is a more subjective 
concept as compared to independence.18 Independence, which is 
more an objective concept, may thus be more straightforwardly 
ascertained by the parties at the outset of the arbitration proceedings 
in light of the circumstances disclosed by the arbitrator, while 
partiality will more likely surface during the arbitration proceedings. 
As the English Arbitration Act of 1996,19 which makes no reference 
to independence, illustrates, impartiality is the crucial requirement 
and cannot be waived in advance by parties. As with English law, 
independence is required of all arbitrators in the majority of other 
national arbitration laws and many arbitration rules as well.20  
Through an exploration of case law, particularly case law and 
procedures in France, this paper will discuss an arbitrator’s duty to 
disclose, what an arbitrator should disclose, and how and when an 
institutional decision on the independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators should take place. 
B. AN ARBITRATOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
Execution of the contract between the parties to the arbitration and 
 
 15. Jivraj, [2011] UKSC, [45]. 
 16. Galliard & Savage, supra note 4, at 562 (quoting Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Apr. 13, 1972, JCP 1972, II, 17189 
(Fr.)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS 119–20 (1991). 
 19. See generally Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (U.K.) (referencing the non-
waivable requirement of “impartiality” but omitting any reference to 
“independence”). 
 20. JEANFRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARÉ DE 
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL [COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION] 366–70 (2002). 
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each arbitrator requires consent of all involved.21 Parties to the 
arbitration can, however, accept the nomination of an arbitrator if 
and when they are made aware of the connections which the 
proposed arbitrator may have with the other parties, their counsel, 
and, possibly, the other members of the Arbitral Tribunal.22 
Independence is a requirement that is in the parties’ interest and 
which they may waive as acknowledged in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.23 It is also accepted in French 
arbitration law that the parties may waive the independence of the 
arbitrators, but they can only do so to the extent they are aware of the 
existing relationships of the arbitrators with the parties or with the 
parties’ counsel.24 In light of the preceding, an arbitrator’s duty to 
disclose is an essential undertaking for the independent and impartial 
resolution of the dispute. It has been characterized as the 
“[c]ornerstone of an arbitrator’s duty of independence. . . .”25  
Currently, disclosure is acknowledged in contemporary arbitration 
law and practice.26 The obligation to disclose and to investigate 
 
 21. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., 
Apr. 13, 1972, JCP 1972, II, 17189 (Fr.); see also Galliard & Savage, supra note 4, 
at 31 (stating that “[t]he contract between the parties is the fundamental constituent 
of international arbitration. It is the parties’ common intention which confers 
powers upon the arbitrators.”). 
 22. Cf. GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, § 4(c)(ii) (Council of the Int’l Bar Ass’n 2004) [hereinafter IBA 
GUIDELINES] (“All parties must expressly agree that such person may serve as 
arbitrator despite the conflict of interest.”). 




 24. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 18, 2004, 
2004 REV. ARB. 989 (Fr.). 
 25. Ahmed S. El-Kosheri & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of 
International Arbitrators: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL 
SUPPLEMENT 43, 51 (2008). 
 26. See, e.g., Anne Marie Whitesell, Independence in ICC Arbitration: ICC 
Court Practice Concerning the Appointment, Confirmation, Challenge and 
Replacement of Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 7, 11 (2008) 
(discussing that in ICC procedure, “[i]n the event of acceptance, the arbitrator must 
also ‘disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might 
be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes 
of the parties.’”). 
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potential conflicts rests primarily on the arbitrator.27 A lawyer acting 
as an arbitrator should perform a conflicts search to inquire about a 
client-law firm relationship and the parties involved in the 
arbitration. It should not be permitted for an arbitrator to be declared 
independent based on the arbitrator’s lack of actual knowledge due to 
a failure to perform a conflict search.28 
The General Standard 7(a) of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration of 22 May 2004 provides that,  
[a] party shall inform the arbitrator, the Arbitral Tribunal, the other parties 
and the arbitration institution or other appointing authority (if any) about 
any direct or indirect relationship between it (or another company of the 
same group of companies) and the arbitrator. The party shall do so at its 
own initiative before the beginning of the proceedings or as soon as it 
becomes aware of such relationship.29  
This should not be seen as a dilution of the arbitrator’s obligation to 
disclose, but rather as a possibility for the parties to make their own 
investigation when difficulties arise regarding the arbitrator’s 
disclosure, such as incomplete statements or hesitations on the part 
of the arbitrator.30 General Standard 7(b) specifies that, “[a] party 
shall provide any information already available to it and shall 
perform a reasonable search of publicly available information.”31 In 
the case of the non-disclosure of a fact that is known by the arbitrator 
and a party, shared liability between them could be considered. As 
between the parties, the other party may claim for a breach of the 
obligation of loyalty, which flows from the arbitration agreement.  
The duty to disclose does not merge in the obligation to be and 
 
 27. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 18, 2003, RG n° 
2002/09750, Annahold. 
 28. See IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 7(c) (stating that a “[f]ailure to 
disclose a potential conflict is not excused by lack of knowledge if the arbitrator 
makes no reasonable attempt to investigate.”). See generally Arthur W. Rovine & 
Christopher Chinn, The International Arbitrator’s Duty to Investigate Conflicts: 
The United States Approach, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. 1 (2008) (discussing 
various bar associations’ requirements that arbitrators make reasonable 
investigations into conflicts of interest). 
 29. IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 7(a). 
 30. See id. § 7 cmt. (“It is the arbitrator or putative arbitrator’s obligation to 
make similar enquiries and to disclose any information that may cause his or her 
impartiality or independence to be called into question.”). 
 31. Id. § 7(b). 
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remain independent. The essential requirement is the honesty with 
which the arbitrator should disclose in order to permit the parties to 
concretely assess his or her situation in the parties’ eyes. 
Nonetheless, an erroneous or otherwise incomplete statement should 
not automatically lead to a recusal of the arbitrator or to annulment 
of the award. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
“[A]rbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business 
relationship with the parties before them if both parties are informed 
of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware of the facts but 
the relationship is trivial.”32 In such case, the judge will assess the 
impact that may be reasonably expected in the parties’ eyes of such 
situation on the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.33  
Should the obligation to disclose be more stringent concerning the 
chair of the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator than regarding co-
arbitrators? International arbitration law and practice make no 
distinction among members of an arbitral tribunal who all perform an 
adjudicative role.34 The case law of the Court of Appeal of Paris has 
given its greatest extent to the duty of independence by considering 
an arbitrator under the same obligation as a judge in this regard: 
“[T]he independence of the arbitrator is essential to his judicial role, 
in that from the time of his appointment he assumes the status of a 
judge, which excludes any relation of dependence, particularly with 
the parties.”35  
Equating an arbitrator to a judge appears to be at variance with 
practice.36 Nomination of a co-arbitrator, as is widely known and 
accepted, has been described in the famous words of a reputed 
practitioner, Martin Hunter, “[w]hen I am representing a client in 
arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party nominated 
arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my 
client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.”37 Professor 
 
 32. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 
(1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 33. Qatar v. Creighton, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e 
ch., Jan. 12, 1996, 1996 REV. ARB. 428 (Fr.). 
 34. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 20, at 366. 
 35. Galliard & Savage, supra note 4, at 565 (quoting Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Paris, June 2, 1989, 1991 REV. ARB. 87 (Fr.)). 
 36. P. BELLET, DES ARBITRES NEUTRES ET NON NEUTRES, ETUDES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE, HELBING AND LICHTENHAHN 399 (1993). 
 37. M. Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, The Journal of the 
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Fadlallah has described that “[a] system whereby each of the parties 
chooses an arbitrator is hardly likely to result in a tribunal which is 
totally indifferent to the parties and their concern.”38 Professor El 
Kosheri and Mr. Karim Youssef write: “[P]arties commonly have a 
two-fold approach to independence. They have a legitimate 
expectation of independence and judge-like behavior from the 
arbitrator appointed by the opposing party, while they expect 
partiality from their own arbitrator.”39 As compared, the parties are 
less likely to waive the independence of the chair of the Tribunal or 
of the sole arbitrator, as this would otherwise result in an imbalance 
in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal which would threaten the 
equilibrium between parties. Because the chair or sole arbitrator 
guarantees that the arbitral tribunal as a whole functions in an 
impartial manner, the obligation to disclose should be considered 
with higher standards.40  
C. WHAT AN ARBITRATOR SHOULD DISCLOSE  
An exercise of practical guidance to what an arbitrator should 
disclose is given in the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration of 22 May 2004.41 French case law 
traditionally holds that,  
[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to disclose all circumstances which may 
reasonably call into question his independence in the mind of the parties 
and should particularly inform the parties of any relationship which is not 
common knowledge and which could be reasonably expected to have an 
 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, November 1987, p. 219. 
 38. Ibrahim Fadlallah, L’ordre Public Dans Les Sentences Arbitrales [Public 
Order in Awards], 249 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L. 369, 379 (1994). 
 39. El-Kosheri & Youssef, supra note 25, at 47–48. 
 40. Cf. Neil Kaplan & Karen Mills, The Role of the Chair in International 
Commercial Arbitration, in THE ASIAN LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119 (Michael Pryles & Michael J. Moser eds., 
2007) (“[The Chair] must oversee all administrative matters as well as procedural 
and substantive matters; be the key liaison among the parties and the other 
arbitrators, between the tribunal and the administering institution, if any, and 
sometimes must even mediate between the other arbitrators where not everyone 
sees eye to eye.”). 
 41. See IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 22, pt. 2 (listing and categorizing what an 
arbitrator should disclose). 
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impact on his judgment in the parties’ eyes.42  
The duty to disclose is widely recognized and easy to formulate,43 
but its application to concrete circumstances is subject to discussion. 
The Nidera v. Leplatre judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal on 
December 16, 2010, illustrates a widely known judgment that 
renders pointless the arbitrator’s duty to disclose. The claimant 
argued that one co-arbitrator had not disclosed that he was the 
chairman of a professional association of which the defendant was a 
member. The Court of Appeal found that this situation was publicly 
known by all involved in agricultural trade, including the applicant, 
and underlined that the defendant was one among the eight hundred 
competing members of the professional association chaired by the 
co-arbitrator. As a consequence, claimant’s objection to the 
regularity of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal as a ground for 
annulment of the award was rejected. The situation was close to 
giving rise to an estoppel as the Court of Appeal remarked that 
Nidera had not challenged the chairman of the tribunal during the 
arbitration proceedings in spite of this publicly known fact.44 Another 
example is when the relationship is trivial and no disclosure is 
needed, such as in Tecso, where the chairman of the Arbitral 
Tribunal was a friend on Facebook of the defendant’s counsel. The 
Court of Appeal held that this circumstance had no bearing on the 
arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.  
The relationship of an arbitrator with another member of the same 
arbitral tribunal may raise questions of his or her impartiality if such 
relationships result in the expression of one single opinion that is 
 
 42. See, for example, the judgments of the Court d’appel of Paris on September 
9, 2010, in Allaire v. SGS Holding and of March 10, 2011, in Allaire, Nykcool v. 
Dole France and Agrunord et al., and in Tecso v. Neoelectra Group. Cour d’appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 2, 1989, 1991 REV. ARB. 87 (Fr.)). 
 43. The new Article 1456 of the French Code of Civil Procedure spells out 
after the January 13, 2011 Reform that “[b]efore accepting a mandate, an arbitrator 
shall disclose any circumstances that may affect his or her independence or 
impartiality. He or she shall disclose promptly any such circumstance that may 
arise after accepting the mandate.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1456 (Fr.). 
 44. Article 1466 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that after the reform 
of January 2011, “[a] party which, knowingly and without a legitimate reason, fails 
to object to an irregularity before the arbitral tribunal in a timely manner shall be 
deemed to have waived its right to avail itself of such irregularity.” C. CIV. art. 
1466. 
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counted twice instead of the addition of two independent opinions, as 
should be the case.45 In the Emivir, Loniewski, Gauthier v. ITM 
judgment of July 2011, the relationship between the chairman of the 
arbitral tribunal and a co-arbitrator was under attack by the applicant, 
who claimed that it cast doubt on the impartiality of the entire 
arbitral tribunal. The applicant contended that the regular 
contribution of the chairman to a law review on the editorial board of 
which a co-arbitrator sat created an intellectual and pecuniary link 
between them. The Court of Appeal of Paris answered that there is 
no interference between the duties of an arbitrator and participation 
in a law review and, consequently, held that neither a relationship of 
subordination nor a business relationship could be said to exist as 
claimed by Emivir et al. The Court concluded that, in the 
circumstances of the case, there was no proof of actual bias on the 
part of the chairman of the tribunal in the eyes of a fair-minded 
observer. This reference to a third-party observer departs from the 
reference generally made to the parties’ mind or the parties’ eyes. It 
should be said that the test for disclosure is not about what the 
arbitrator may think about his or her situation but, rather, about what 
may raise a reasonable suspicion in the parties’ mind as to the 
independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.46 However, 
arbitrators may find it difficult to discover what is in the parties’ 
mind. Reference to a fair-minded observer, which should be taken to 
mean a fair-minded or reasonable party, brings some objectivity in 
an otherwise overly subjective exercise for the arbitrator. In the 
circumstances of the Emivir case, the Court said that there was no 
obligation for the chairman to disclose his participation in the law 
review to the parties.  
If we now turn to case law concerning non-trivial conflicts of 
interest, the globalization of world trade and commerce also concerns 
 
 45. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 
29, 2002, JCP 2003, I, 105, obs. J. Béguin (Fr.). 
 46. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Mar. 16, 1999, 1999 REV. ARB. 308 (Fr.) (noting that the duty of the judge on 
appeal is to assess whether the circumstances were likely to cause either party to 
have a reasonable doubt as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator); 
see also Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 43d Sess., June 21–July 9, 2010, 
Annex I, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/63/17; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010) 
(“Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”). 
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legal services including those offered in international arbitration. 
Cooperation among businesses increases in order to meet new 
market opportunities. In such context where large international law 
firms are serving clients in many jurisdictions, potential conflicts are 
also increasing. As was pointed out by Professor El Kosheri, “[w]hat 
matters in the large majority of cases is not the existence of business 
or personal relations, but the declaration of such relations by the 
arbitrator. It is secrecy that is the problem.”  
In this area, the Court of Appeal of Paris recently handed down a 
number of important decisions that added significant detail regarding 
an arbitrator’s obligation to disclose. The first is the judgment of 
September 9, 2010 in Allaire v. SGS Holding. Allaire, alleged in the 
arbitration proceedings that the co-arbitrator nominated by SGS had a 
significant consulting practice with the defendant’s counsel. The co-
arbitrator replied that he had indeed provided such services to the 
law firm representing the defendant but added that he had not done 
any work for this law firm since the beginning of the arbitration. 
However, he declined to give any further information as to the 
amount of fees received for his consultancy work. The Court held 
that the co-arbitrator’s relationship with the defendant’s counsel was 
neither occasional nor had it happened in the distant past and 
concluded that such circumstances could give rise to reasonable 
doubts in the claimants’ eyes. It decided to annul the award that had 
been rendered by the arbitral tribunal within twelve days after the 
information given to the parties by the co-arbitrator, finding that 
Allaire had raised objections relating to the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal in the course of the arbitration. Therefore, the matter 
was not estopped from being heard before the Court.  
In two other decisions from March 2011, Nykcool v. Dole France 
and Agrunord et al. and Tecso v. Neoelectra Group, the Court of 
Appeal annulled awards for lack of independence and impartiality of 
the arbitrators. In Nykcool, all the members of the arbitral tribunal 
declined to make any statement regarding their independence. The 
chairman, on behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal, merely expressed the 
arbitrators’ regret about the claimant’s suspicious attitude. The Court 
of Appeal held that the arbitrators’ refusal to disclose their 
relationships with the parties raised a reasonable doubt about their 
independence and impartiality. Moreover, it stressed that the co-
arbitrator nominated by the defendants was involved in other arbitral 
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proceedings with the defendants. The Court’s holding, that 
arbitrators should disclose their relationships with parties, deserves 
total approval.  
For example, in Tecso, the co-arbitrator nominated by the 
defendant had been of counsel between 1989 and 2000 with the same 
law firm as defendant’s counsel in the arbitration and had given only 
vague information regarding his activity with said law firm after 
2000. The Court of Appeal found that this attitude gave rise to 
reasonable doubts regarding the co-arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality. 
These three cases shed light on the practical application of the 
arbitrator’s obligation to disclose all circumstances concerning the 
existence of professional and financial association with counsel in 
the case. When an arbitrator knows of a potential conflict, a failure to 
disclose is indicative of a lack of independence. The Allaire 
judgment notes the “elliptic character” of the statement made by the 
impugned co-arbitrator and the Tecso case refers to the vague 
information provided by the co-arbitrator nominated by the 
defendant about the number of legal opinions given to the law firm 
of defendant’s counsel after 2000. In Nykcool, no disclosure was ever 
made. The arbitrators’ failure or spontaneous refusal to disclose their 
relationships with the parties’ counsel, as well as their continued 
failure to disclose full information in this regard, so seriously 
affected the relationship of confidence with the parties that they 
could no longer be trusted regarding the accuracy of the information 
finally disclosed.  
Sobrior and Potier v. ITM and La Violette, decided by the Paris 
Court of Appeal on July 1, 2011, illustrates the opposite situation 
where the chairman had on his own initiative disclosed to the parties 
at an early stage in the arbitration that he had chaired arbitral 
tribunals in cases involving the franchisor party and mass marketing 
businesses. Although the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal had failed 
to disclose a prior appointment as arbitrator by a franchising 
company unrelated to the group of companies of the franchisor party 
involved in the arbitration proceedings, the Court of Appeal held that 
the chairman’s incomplete statement raised no doubts as to his 
independence or impartiality.  
The aforementioned case law is an invitation to arbitrators to 
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disclose any kind of relationship they may have with the parties and 
their counsel, even at the risk of appearing overly cautious.  
D. WHEN AND HOW A REVIEW OF AN 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE 
AND IMPARTIALITY OF ARBITRATORS SHOULD 
TAKE PLACE  
The existence or absence of independence and impartiality on the 
part of an arbitrator in the challenge of an award proceeding is a 
question over which French Courts enjoy full reviewing power.47 For 
reasons that pertain to the loyalty and efficiency of the proceedings, 
the issue of the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator must 
be raised, whenever possible, in the course of the arbitration 
proceedings in order to be considered as an admissible ground for 
challenge of the validity of the award.48 In a similar vein, arbitration 
rules provide for a time limit for bringing a request for challenge 
after information of the facts or circumstances on which the 
challenge is based.49 It is a well-settled question in French arbitration 
law that the Rules of the arbitration institution nominated in the 
arbitration agreement “[c]onstitute the laws of the parties and must 
be applied to the exclusion of all other laws.”50 The contractually 
 
 47. See Phillipe Leboulanger, Note, Cour de cassation (1re Ch. Civile) 6 
Janvier 1987, 1987 REV. ARB. 469, 473 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court for 
Judicial Matters held that Courts of Appeal are not restricted in their ability to 
examine both the legal and factual elements concerning allegedly flawed 
arbitration). 
 48. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
July 6, 2005, 2005 REV. ARB. 993 (Fr.) (finding that a failure to raise objections at 
the time of arbitration makes later objections inadmissible under the doctrine of 
estoppel); see also CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1466 (Fr.) (“A party 
which knowingly and without good cause fails to timely object to an irregularity 
during arbitration is deemed to have wavier the right to appeal.”). 
 49. See C.P.C. art. 1468 (“The arbitrator shall fix a date on which the matter 
will adjourn for deliberation. After this date, no objection or motion may be made. 
No representations may be made nor evidence produced, except at the request of 
the arbitrator.”). 
 50. Raffineries de Homs et de Banias, supra; see also C.P.C., art. 1485 (“When 
a court hears an action to set aside an arbitration award, it decides the merits within 
the same framework as the arbitrator, unless the parties agree otherwise.”); see also 
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Oct. 28, 1988, 1990 REV. ARB. 497 (Fr.) (stating that the question of alleged lack 
of independence and impartiality may only be analyzed by reference to the Rules 
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agreed upon time limit in the Arbitration Rules is binding on the 
arbitration institution and the parties, but it does not bind the court 
that has an independent assessment on the admissibility of lack of 
independence and impartiality as a ground for challenging the award. 
The reviewing court exercises a different type of control than that of 
the arbitration institution.51 This does not preclude the courts from 
reviewing the exercise of powers of the arbitration institution in 
connection with challenge or replacement of an arbitrator in 
proceedings on the validity of the award.52  
In the case of an institutional or administered arbitration, however, 
no judicial recourse can lie against the decision of an arbitration 
institution, either by way of a setting aside action as ruled by the 
Court of Appeal of Paris in the Opinter judgment of 1985 or by way 
of a direct attack as decided in 1985 by the same Court in the 
Raffineries d’Homs et de Banias case.53 There is only an indirect 
review in the course of the challenge proceedings of the award if it is 
impugned on the ground of an irregularity in the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal.54 This absence of judicial remedy explains in the 
context of the prohibition of any interference by State Courts in the 
organization and implementation of the arbitral proceedings by the 
arbitral institution whenever such institution has acted in accordance 
with its rules. Moreover, the Court of Appeal of Paris ruled in 
 
of Arbitration of the French Association for Cocoa Commerce because the 
arbitration agreement stipulated those Rules should be applied). 
 51. Compare C.P.C. art. 1485 (“An arbitration award is not subject to objection 
or appeal.”), with Leboulanger, supra note 47 (explaining that, although parties 
may not directly appeal an arbitration award, a Court of Appeal may examine how 
the arbitrators reached decided the award and whether they violated any rules to 
which they are subject). 
 52. See Leboulanger, supra note 47 (explaining that an appellate court may 
review whether arbitrators should have been removed for failing to the conditions 
of the arbitration contract). 
 53. Ernest Mezger, Note, Cour d’appel de Paris (1re Ch. suppl.) 15 janvier 
1985, 1986 REV. ARB. 87 (1986) (stating that when an arbitration is 
institutionalized, French law respects the freedom of the parties to contract for 
these rules and the removal of an arbitrator should therefore be through the 
institution’s rules and not judicial review so long as an award has not yet been 
rendered). 
 54.  See Leboulanger, supra note 47 (holding when a Court of Appeals hears a 
challenge to an award, it is limited to hearing issues related to violations of the 
rules of the arbitration and the rights of the defense and may not hear arguments 
relating to the award itself). 
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Raffineries d’Homs et de Banias that a decision on challenge of the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration is an administrative measure 
and does not have the legal nature of a judicial act.55 Because the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration does not perform a judicial 
function, the finality of the decision on a challenge that is laid down 
in the ICC Arbitration Rules does not preclude public Courts from 
reviewing independence and impartiality of arbitrators as an 
independent ground of challenge of the award.56 Final decision on 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators is also in English law 
and not left to the decision of the arbitration institution. The 
provisions of the 1996 English Arbitration Act57 concerning the 
requirements of impartiality are regarded as matters of mandatory 
public policy and, as a result, the Courts make a final determination 
on the issue.58  
A distinction should be drawn between two situations. In the first 
case, like in Opinter,59 the arbitration institution rejects the challenge 
of the arbitrator. Therefore, the issue revolves around the 
independence and impartiality of the said arbitrator, who has 
rendered the award to be examined by the Court in the context of a 
review. In the second case, such as was the case in Raffineries de 
Homs et de Banias, the challenge of the arbitrator had been accepted 
by the arbitration institution. The decision of the ICC international 
Court of Arbitration took immediate effect, and a new arbitrator had 
been nominated. Is the solution of awaiting the making of the award 
 
 55. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 15, 1985, 1985 
REV. ARB. 141 (Fr.). 
 56. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Jan. 12, 
1996, 1996 REV. ARB. 428 (Fr.) (holding that it is an undisputed that courts may 
review the independence and impartiality of arbitrators). 
 57. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 24(1)(a) (U.K.) (granting courts the power, 
upon application by a party, to remove an arbitrator when “circumstances exist that 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the [the arbitrator’s] impartiality”). 
 58. Lord Steyn, England: The Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators 
in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS: 2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 91, 95 
(2008) (stating that parties may not leave the final decision on independence and 
impartiality to be decided under the rules of an institutional arbitration court, but 
that a legal court has the final determination as a matter of public policy). 
 59. See Mezger, supra note 53 (holding that where an arbitrator has failed to 
recuse himself upon a request by a party, an appeal may be taken after the award is 
finalized so long as a timely objection is made). 
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before challenging it on the ground of an improper constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal such as established by the case law of the Court of 
Appeal of Paris in 1985 in Raffineries de Homs et de Banias a 
satisfactory one? Without waiting for the award, shouldn’t the 
damage be cured by a review of the arbitration institution’s decision 
to accept the challenge? 
It must be acknowledged that review of the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators at the setting aside or enforcement of 
award stage becomes devoid of much sense when an arbitrator has 
been replaced by the arbitration institution in the course of the 
arbitration proceedings. If the objecting party can adduce evidence 
that the arbitration institution has failed to act in pursuance of its 
Rules, there is room for intervention of the court acting in support of 
the arbitration.60 This solution can be deduced from the Sté 
Chérifienne des Pétroles judgment of 1991.61 The aggrieved party 
may also bring proceedings against the arbitration institution to hold 
it liable for its action in connection with the challenge.62 Such 
judicial action would not characterize as interfering in the arbitration 
proceedings because the review of the administrative decision of the 
arbitration institution actually remains outside the exercise of the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to adjudicate the merits of the dispute.  
It has been held by the Court of Appeal of Paris that courts cannot 
suspend or terminate the contract between the arbitration institution 
and the parties to the arbitration agreement as soon as the arbitral 
tribunal has been constituted.63 The arbitration agreement, which is 
 
 60. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1459 (Fr.) (granting Courts 
of Grande Instance jurisdiction to support arbitration proceedings); Leboulanger, 
supra note 47 (holding that a court may review whether an arbitrator followed the 
rules of arbitration); see also Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 18, 1991, 1996 REV. ARB. 503, 505 (Fr.) (holding 
a court may not interfere with the procedures of an arbitration unless a violation of 
the agreed rules for arbitration is acknowledged or proven by a party). 
 61. TGI Paris, 18 January 1991, Sté Chérifienne des Pétroles v. CCI, Rev. arb. 
1996.503, note by Ph. Fouchard. 
 62. See Pierre Bellet, Note, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (référé) 13 
julliet 1988 – société R.E.C.E.C. et Pharaon v. société Uzinexport Import et 
Chambre de commerce internationale, 1989 REV. ARB. 97, 101 (Fr.) (positing that 
a party may claim damages against an institutional arbitrator if it has committed a 
gross violation of the rules of arbitration). 
 63. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e civ., Nov. 18, 1987, 
1988 REV. ARB. 657 (Fr.) (reversing the judgment of a trial court to suspend an 
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within the exclusive purview of the arbitral tribunal according to the 
competence-competence principle, must be carefully distinguished 
from the agreement of the parties to the arbitration with the 
arbitration institution.64 In the Cubic case for example, the Court of 
Appeal of Paris and the Cour de cassation ruled over a claim to hold 
the contract with the ICC void.65 In a like manner, in the case of 
Raffineries de Homs et de Banias, the damage claim by this Syrian 
party against the ICC for the alleged wrongful dismissal of the co-
arbitrator nominated by them raised no concern regarding the 
arbitrators’ jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the dispute. 
Moreover, Raffineries de Homs adduced no evidence that the ICC 
violated its Rules, and its claim was held inadmissible. 
The exclusion of all direct legal remedy against the challenge 
decision made by an arbitral institution raises an issue regarding the 
right of access to a court that is protected by Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.66 Regardless of its nature, 
administrative or other, the challenge of an arbitrator is a decision 
with important consequences for the arbitration and should be 
 
arbitration on the grounds that the proper supportive role of a court is to allow 
arbitrators space to fulfill their responsibilities to provide a fair arbitration through 
the exercise of powers legitimately given by consent of the parties). 
 64. See CLAY, supra note 2, at 115 (defining the competence-competence 
principle as the ability of the arbitral tribunal to determine the extent of its 
jurisdiction to hear matters relating to the arbitration agreement); id. at 153 (stating 
that both the travaux préparatoires of the UNCITRAL Model Law and French 
jurisprudence recognize the distinction between the express autonomy of 
arbitration agreements and the principle of competence-competence). 
 65. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e civ., Sept. 15, 
1998, 1999 REV. ARB. 103, 109–10 (Fr.) (holding that where it is shown that party 
clearly manifested its acceptance of an arbitration agreement, the trial court was 
correct to rule that the contract was valid and that arbitration must proceed as laid 
out therein); see also Thomas Clay, Note, Cour de cassation (1re Ch. civile) 20 
février 2001, 2001 REV. ARB. 511 (2001) (offering that the validity of an 
arbitration agreement in a contract should be distinguished by reference to the 
particular center for arbitrage: if the contract is ambiguous about the reference, it 
will only be valid if the parties both agree to the center expressly or implicitly; if 
the contract is specific about the center, it will be valid as soon as one party 
contacts the center, thereby completing the offer and acceptance necessary to form 
a common law contract). 
 66. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 12–18 (1975) 
(holding that the right to bring a civil claim before a court is fundamental, and 
positing that if this right is remote or effective access a court is hindered, even in a 
temporary character, that the claimant may have been denied this right). 
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distinguished from the administrative and organizational decisions 
otherwise made by the arbitration institution. There should be room 
for an immediate application to the court against the decision on 
challenge of the arbitration institution. As a consequence, the 
position of the French courts should be reversed.  
